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Abstract 
This paper examines the strategies and dilemmas faced by local employers andtrade 
unions in Britain in responding to austerity measures. Drawing on two local 
authority case studies this paper extends strategic choice analysis highlighting the 
use of pro-austerity and anti-austerity frames by local actors to advance their 
strategies. We challenge the dominant interpretation of austerity as signalling the 
triumph of neo-liberalism in which there is no scope for the exercise of strategic 
choice with the assumption Conservative and Labour councils pursue similar 
policies of outsourcing and wage cuts. Our findings consider austerity as practice as 
well as ideology and indicate variable responses at local level by employers and 
trade unions. These differentiated outcomes underline the divergent policy responses 
to the economic crisis between and within countries. 
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Text 
A characteristic of all British governments’ policy programmes in recent decades 
has been the centrality of public sector restructuring that has redrawn the boundaries 
of the state, encouraged marketization and altered the terrain in which trade unions 
organize and represent their members (Bach and Kessler, 2012). The onset of the 
economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures across Europe has 
directed attention at how far the crisis represents a critical juncture that is bringing 
about the transformation of public sector employment relations (Bach and Bordogna, 
2016; Katz, 2013). Trade unions have had difficulties in challenging policies of 
retrenchment, despite widespread protests, and wage cuts and employment 
reductions have had detrimental effects for union membership (Forth and Bryson, 
2015; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). Related trends, including viewing trade unions 
as simply one interest group amongst many others, and the failure to effectively 
contest the ideology of austerity, have also been identified as a source of waning 
trade union membership and influence (Culpepper and Regan, 2014; Hyman, 2015). 
Employers have been encouraged to view budgetary restrictions as necessitating 
workforce innovation and creating opportunities to transform the management of the 
workforce that may include partnering with trade unions (CBI, 2012; CIPD, 2012; 
PWC, 2014). Immediate budgetary reductions and political pressure for rapid 
change, however, may lead employers to fall back on familiar repertoires, centred 
on reduced terms and conditions of employment, limited consultation and few 
opportunities for trade union voice (Marchington and Kynighou, 2012; Grimshaw, 
2013; Whitfield, 2012). Any challenge to public sector trade union membership and 
influence is important for the trade union movement, increasingly confined to the 
public sector. Trade union density in the public sector is 54 per cent compared to 14 
per cent in the private sector, but public sector membership still declined between 
2010–2014 (BIS, 2015). Austerity measures therefore raise questions about the 
appropriate response of organised labour and why trade unions find it so difficult to 
oppose effectively government retrenchment measures (Hyman, 2015). 
This article examines the responses of local government employers and trade unions 
in a continuing period of retrenchment. This is addressed through the lens of two 
local government case studies and examines the scope for the application of strategic 
choice by local authority employers and trade unions in reshaping employment 
relations in a context of fiscal consolidation. The findings highlight distinctive 
employer approaches in the involvement of the workforce and differentiated 
responses by trade unions, but some similarities emerge between the cases in terms 
of employment reductions. The paper repositions strategic choice frameworks to 
develop a more dynamic understanding of the blending of choice and constraint; 
institutional and ideological constraints may be enabling as well as constraining 
because dominant ideas about the necessity of austerity measures are marshalled and 
framed by local actors to advance their strategies. 
We challenge the dominant interpretation of austerity as signalling the triumph of 
neo-liberalism in which there is no scope for the exercise of strategic choice because 
of the emphasis on cutting public spending. Such an interpretation suggests that 
traditional party policy differences between Conservative and Labour councils are 
set aside as austerity measures lead to a low road of outsourcing and wage cuts 
(Blyth, 2013; Whitfield, 2012). Our findings point to more diverse consequences, by 
addressing austerity as practice as well as ideology, and our cases indicate variable 
responses by employers and trade unions at local level. Austerity has had wide 
appeal in recent times (Blyth, 2013), but local actors frame austerity to pursue their 
own agendas and to contest specific practices. This leads to differentiated rather than 
standardised outcomes, resembling the divergent policy responses between countries 
(Bach and Bordogna, 2016). 
1. Local government restructuring and the 
challenges facing trade unions 
There are 353 local authorities, often referred to as councils, in England and they are 
responsible for environmental services, leisure facilities, planning, social services 
and a diminishing number of directly managed schools. Local authorities are 
overseen by elected politicians and are usually controlled by one of the two dominant 
political parties, the Conservative or Labour Party. What is distinctive about the 
dynamics of local government, however, is that electoral turnout is low and the focus 
is on electing a political party. There is no tradition of direct elections for mayors, 
with the main exception of London. Councillors are part-time politicians, they are 
not employees of the council, and they do not hold other political office, such as 
being a member of parliament. The head of the council, selected by the dominant 
party, is termed “the leader” but would rarely be well known amongst the local 
electorate. Consequently council leaders do not have the level of authority of French 
mayors and need to work closely with their senior managers, whose job tenure is not 
dependent on the party in power. The dynamics of local decision making depends to 
a great extent on the relationship between the council leader and the chief executive 
with variation between local authorities. One traditional source of variation relates 
to local trade union pressure that have often exerted considerable influence over 
Labour councillors (Colling, 1993; Laffin, 1989). In a period of austerity, however, 
many commentators argue that these political differences are much less important as 
the ideology of austerity and the scale of budgetary reductions forces local 
government to pursue similar retrenchment strategies (Blyth, 2012; Whitfield, 
2012). 
Local government autonomy is constrained not only by a highly centralised system 
of financing but also limited devolution by central government. Local authorities are 
required to balance their budgets on an annual basis, but central government funding 
to local authorities has declined by around 37 per cent between 2010-2015 (NAO, 
2015). Staffing comprises a third of local authorities’ total service costs. And local 
authorities employ their own staff and participate in national level pay bargaining 
that establishes pay and core national conditions for the local government sector. 
From 2010, a prolonged period of pay restraint occurred with a three year pay freeze 
resulting in no national pay increase for the core local government workforce, 
although individual local authorities have some flexibility over pay and grading. 
The structure of trade unionism in the sector reflects the complexity and historical 
evolution of trade unionism in Britain in which no single organisational principle — 
industry, occupation or political ideology is dominant. A number of trade unions 
with open membership criteria recruit in the public sector and there are also more 
closed occupational trade unions, such as for teachers. Three main general trade 
unions — Unison, Unite and the GMB — have sizeable memberships in local 
government and compete to recruit predominantly non-qualified, administrative 
staff and some semi-professions. Local government union density has been 
estimated at around 40 per cent (Unite, 2013). 
Trade unions confront a range of difficulties that mirror the challenges of the broader 
trade union movement. The implementation of austerity measures represents the 
latest phase of attempts to restructure public services and alter the role of the state 
(Burton, 2013; Whitfield, 2012). Fragmentation, commercialisation and outsourcing 
of services such as refuse collection has spread into administrative functions 
including payroll and human resources management (HR). This process has been 
accompanied by inferior rates of pay for new starters and the undermining of labour 
standards (Smith Institute, 2014). Outsourcing has been extended beyond large 
private sector providers to include social enterprises and mutuals. Local authorities 
are also using shared service models and other forms of partnership working for 
service delivery on a more frequent basis. The growth in the number and type of 
employer increases the workload for trade unions in organising and representing 
their membership effectively. This increased diversity is illustrated by the case of 
Unison, in which 22% of new members in 2015-2016 that joined the local 
government group are employed in the private sector (Unison, 2016). 
These indirect effects on union membership and organisation have been 
accompanied by the direct effects of austerity with a large reduction in local 
government employment. Between 2010-2015 employment reductions amounted to 
almost 22 per cent of the local government workforce in excess of 600,000 
staff (ONS, 2015). Unison is illustrative of the impact on union membership with a 
decline in 2015-2016 of its local government membership of over 30,000, including 
many activists (Unison, 2016). Trade unions also confront an ageing membership 
and face difficulties in recruiting young workers. The number of “never members” 
with no experience of trade unionism is continuing to increase (Bryson and Forth, 
2014). These complex challenges have added urgency to the search for strategies to 
reverse trade union membership and influence. 
2. Choice and constraint in public services 
employment relations 
2.1. Employer strategy in response to local government 
restructuring 
Continuous restructuring and austerity measures that mimicked aspects of private 
sector practice has stimulated interest in the extent to which analytical frameworks 
used to assess management strategy in the private sector can be applied to public 
services, whilst remaining sensitive to particular contexts in which they operate 
(Kessler and Purcell, 1996; Truss, 2013). Child (1972, 1997) is highly critical of 
environmental determinism and suggests that private or public sector leaders have 
scope to influence organisational forms in line with their own preferences. This more 
voluntaristic and agency centred approach is underpinned by the idea of strategic 
choice which recognises the dynamic tension between context and actor agency. 
Dominant stakeholders act purposefully, selecting strategies that take account of, but 
are not determined by their environmental context. 
In assessing their applicability to the public sector, Laffin’s (1989) study of local 
government is instructive because it examines management and union responses in 
a period of market-based reforms and a restrictive expenditure context. Laffin (1989) 
draws on two case studies of a Conservative authority (Conshire) and a Labour 
authority (Labshire) that pursued distinctive management strategies, shaped by their 
different political programmes. Retrenchment and outsourcing were dominant in 
Conshire whilst attempts to avoid outsourcing and increase efficiency by 
redeployment and the use of temporary staff were favoured approaches in Labshire. 
Nonetheless, external pressures associated with budgetary reductions made it 
difficult to maintain workforce cooperation even in Labshire in which trade unions 
were traditionally supportive of the Labour Council. Each employer exercised a 
degree of strategic choice in pursuing different approaches to reorganising work and 
staffing patterns, but there was much less commitment to altering structures of trade 
union representation and changing national systems of pay determination. This 
indicates that despite a weakening of trade unionism during the 1980s as a result of 
outsourcing strategies, a residual commitment to a good employer tradition did not 
lead to a fundamental challenge to the role of trade unions. 
Kessler and Purcell (1996, 2000a) developed a more formal model of the strategic 
choice framework and examined its application in a range of public services. Their 
framework differentiated between upstream decisions on organisational strategy and 
structure that influence downstream decisions on human resource practice and 
management-union relations. Consequently, differences in upstream organisational 
strategy between local authorities had major consequences for downstream 
decisions. In the case of a radical Conservative council a commitment to encourage 
competition led to the establishment of numerous different semi-independent 
business units. But there was much less differentiation between the two local 
authorities in terms of pay determination and union-management relations with both 
authorities following established models in the sector. Employer’s therefore 
continued to accept trade union presence and there was no frontal assault on trade 
unions, for example in terms of union derecognition. 
These studies identify scope for managerial choice and highlight environmental 
constraints, but portray these constraints as detrimental to managerial action, 
encouraging policy makers to focus on the removal of managerial constraints (see 
Truss, 2009). By contrast Streeck (1997) refers to “beneficial constraints” that close 
off certain choices for the collective benefit of all stakeholders. For example, 
national pay agreements prevent poaching by individual employers and encourage 
national mobility and skills acquisition (Beszter et al., 2015). Constraints can 
therefore be enabling because actors reposition environmental constraints as 
resources to advance their objectives (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). The application 
of external standards (a type of constraint) such as an employer becoming a living 
wage employer may be used as a resource to signal that an employer is a “good 
employer” and provide legitimacy for other managerial decisions and enhance 
recruitment and retention. Consequently, the application of constraints may open up 
additional choices for employers. 
Strategic choices are being fashioned in a context in which an ideology of austerity 
and the necessity of expenditure cuts is the dominant narrative (Blyth, 2013). 
Strategic choice analysis requires refinement to incorporate the role of prevalent 
ideologies in facilitating as well as constraining local managerial responses. McCann 
(2013) highlights the way that actors have drawn on specific beliefs and values about 
the public sector to narrate a particular version of the financial crisis, to apportion 
blame and to propose specific solutions that require austerity measures. Policy 
makers use “mechanisms of hope” (Brunsson, 2006) to signal a trade-off between 
immediate sacrifices in return for a better future and rhetoric is deployed to help 
frame and gain acceptance for budgetary cuts. McCann (2013) distinguishes 
between pro-austerity and anti-austerity framing devices with pro-austerity 
assumptions portraying employment and wage cuts as essential to restore economic 
growth. By contrast, the anti-austerity frame identifies austerity as a means to punish 
public sector workers, reduce trade union influence and shrink the state. McCann 
(2013) focuses on policy makers but local actors may draw on pro-austerity frames 
to reposition external constraints as enablers of change, whilst trade unions may 
advance anti-austerity frames to try and limit deleterious managerial choices. 
2.2. Trade unions: Scope for strategic choice? 
In Britain and many other countries that have experienced severe trade union 
membership decline there has been a major shift in policy and practice (Boxall and 
Haynes, 1997; Fairbrother et al., 2012). A focus on the external environment (such 
as the business cycle) has been augmented by consideration of how trade unions 
marshal their own resources and membership to reverse decline (Gall, 2010). Some 
caution is needed in applying strategic choice frameworks to trade unions because 
trade unions are secondary organisations in which union members have already been 
organized into distinctive groups and relationships by employers (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1985, p. 176). This does not preclude the development of union strategy, 
but can be expected to influence union-employer relations and trade union member 
responses. 
Despite these caveats, a number of strategic choices have been identified for 
engaging with employers and trade union members, centred on partnership and 
organising. They have been counter-posed as alternative strategies because their 
differing ideological assumptions and approaches make it difficult to blend these 
strategies (de Turberville, 2004; Heery, 2002; Simms, 2015). Partnership, often 
referred to as organisational partnership to distinguish it from higher-level tripartite 
social partnership, is centred on ideas of reciprocity and mutuality. There is a 
recognition that differences of interest exist between trade unions and employers but 
ultimately trade unions committed to partnership co-operate with employers. In 
return, trade unions are granted increased access and information from senior 
managers, enhanced legitimacy with employers and support to recruit trade union 
members (Johnstone, 2015). 
Critics suggest that partnership strategies demobilise trade union members, are 
incompatible with more participative organising approaches, and any benefits accrue 
disproportionately to employers (Kelly, 2004). For other commentators outcomes 
are less clear cut and scope for partnership strategies exist when employers are not 
hostile to trade unions, when there is a commitment from top management towards 
partnership working, and when an employment relations strategy is pursued that 
emphasises labour flexibility rather than cost minimisation (Simms, 2015, p. 138). 
Bacon and Samuel (2009) indicate that the overwhelming proportion of formal 
partnership agreements have been concluded in the public sector, indicating that 
these preconditions may be more prevalent in the public sector. 
In contrast to partnership, organising is centred on building vibrant workplace 
organisation with active members. Workplace leaders are developed and encouraged 
to mobilise around specific local issues, suggestive of a more militant orientation 
rather than the moderation associated with partnership. Although reference is often 
made to an “organising model” there are a number of distinctive approaches and 
techniques adopted by different trade unions (de Turberville, 2004 ; Simms et al., 
2013). The evolution of organising in Britain has involved the establishment of an 
organising Academy, emphasis on consolidating union membership in existing 
organisations and sectors rather than in distant, unorganised, sectors and placing less 
emphasis on organising as part of a broader social movement. This has generated 
criticism that trade unions have been too cautious in pursuing an organising agenda 
that has resulted in very limited outcomes (Gall, 2010 ; Simms et al., 2015). 
In summary, the restructuring of the public sector and a period of austerity have 
sharpened the choices that employers and trade unions confront. Strategic choice 
frameworks have been applied to the public sector but give insufficient attention to 
the scope to blend choice and constraint. The importance of ideology and history in 
framing decisions has also been underplayed and these insights may be especially 
pertinent in a period of austerity and highly relevant for trade unions with strategic 
choices shaped by the values of trade union members. Employers and trade unions 
have scope to frame local responses, but it is uncertain if employers are seeking to 
enhance trade union and workforce involvement and develop forms of partnership 
or are seeking to confront or bypass trade unions. It is plausible that a context of 
severe budgetary cuts may have encouraged employers to act more unilaterally and 
pursue a low road strategy centred on employment and wage reductions with little 
opportunity for trade union voice, but such a strategy could also generate risks for 
employers in a sector that remains highly unionised. The extent to which the political 
party controlling a local authority remains important is also uncertain because 
budgetary constraints have led to large employment reductions across local 
government. 
3. Methods 
A qualitative research approach was adopted in order to understand the process of 
decision making in each local authority and actor responses in a context of austerity. 
Case study methods are a flexible means to understand the interaction of choice and 
constraint in conditions of considerable uncertainty and to capture the perceptions 
and rationales underpinning these decisions. Both local authorities studied, termed 
Mid-Town and Coastal, are urban councils based in the South of England, with 
similar levels of deprivation and expenditure cuts. The local authorities differed, 
however, in important respects notably in terms of size and political complexion. 
Mid-Town was a smaller council employing a workforce of almost 1,400 fulltime-
equivalent (FTE) staff compared to Coastal’s 6,700 (Figure 1) at the start of the crisis 
in 2008. This large difference reflected Coastal’s additional responsibility for 
schools and social services provision. Both councils had faced substantial reductions 
in revenue spending power between 2011-2013 with a 13.4 per cent reduction for 
Mid-Town and an 8.7 per cent reduction for Coastal. Mid-Town was a Labour 
controlled council whilst Coastal was a Conservative administered council. 
The two local authority case studies were purposefully selected because national 
respondents identified them as in the vanguard of refashioning employment 
relations. It is not suggested that they are typical of how local authorities are 
responding and therefore their experiences may not be generalizable to other 
authorities. Instead, it is the distinctiveness of the two case studies that provide their 
value because they have been identified by national respondents as critical cases in 
terms of the strategies that they have pursued. In seeking to respond to a shifting 
policy environment by redirecting employment relations strategy both authorities 
were explicit in exercising a degree of strategic choice. Consequently the interaction 
between choice and constraint is more identifiable and visible than in more 
incremental forms of change. 
Fieldwork comprised semi-structured interviews with elected councillors, the 
leaders of each council, senior and line managers and workforce representatives. 
Interviews were supplemented by examination of corporate plans, minutes of 
council meetings and workforce data as well as analysis of local trade union branch 
documentation. The interview schedule covered the themes of the analytical 
framework : the context and drivers for organisational strategy in each local 
authority ; why these choices had been selected and the role of austerity measures in 
framing choice and constraint ; and the downstream consequences for rewards and 
management-union relations. Interviews typically lasted 60 minutes in length and 
were digitally recorded and fully transcribed. 
To gain a better understanding of the specificities of organisational and HR policy 
choice and constraint, the case study interviews were contextualised by sectoral level 
interviews with national level respondents that included local authority HR directors, 
national employer representatives, trade union officials and local government policy 
makers. The sample comprised 39 interviews of which half the interviews were 
conducted in the case study authorities. The research was conducted after the 
announcement of the Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010 that unveiled large 
reductions in local government expenditure and was undertaken mainly during 2012-
13. Contact was maintained with case study respondents presenting at seminars 
organised by the research team and findings were sent to key case study 
stakeholders. Data analysis followed the protocol recommended by Ritchie et 
al. (2003), and compromised reading and re-reading the transcripts enabling 
familiarisation with the data to identify recurring themes related to choice and 
constraint. From this familiarisation process broad codes were developed and refined 
in the light of unexpected information. Data was then charted within the framework 
to highlight themes and provide explanations of developments in the cases. 
4. Upstream decisions: Restructuring, HR 
and financial viability 
4.1. Mid-Town 
Mid-Town is a Labour controlled city based council that departed from a traditional 
Labour Party policy approach (see Colling, 1993 ; Laffin 1989). A new council 
leadership inherited a deteriorating financial position and used a climate of austerity 
to frame a policy programme that required concessions from the workforce but that 
was accompanied by maintaining services in-house and partnering with trade unions. 
It combined “tough love” in establishing tight performance expectations and 
concerted attempts to gain workforce agreement, cemented in a collective agreement 
that involved local negotiations on pay and conditions. The upstream strategy 
involved maintaining services in-house by improving service delivery and 
increasing revenue generation by trading council services to other local businesses. 
During 2010 the Labour Party took full control of the council from a minority Liberal 
Democrat administration. 
The alliance between the chief executive (CEO) and the council leader (the senior 
elected politician) was the core relationship that developed as the consequences of 
the financial crisis unfolded. The Leader was a senior HR manager who shared a 
belief with the CEO that effective financial management was required to improve 
services, prevent privatisation and avoid mandatory redundancies. Mid-Town’s 
reputation in the mid-late 2000s was of a poorly managed council, reflected in a 
“weak” rating from the government’s auditors and rapid turnover of successive chief 
executives. In part, poor performance was attributed to long-serving labour 
councillors defending the interests of staff, preventing changes in staff management 
and working practices. 
The strategy devised by the incoming CEO and the council leader was based on 
plans to improve service delivery, enhance staff performance and remodel labour–
management relations towards a more collaborative approach. The council 
leadership’s preference was to maintain services in-house to maintain control over 
local services, ensure savings accrued to Mid-Town rather than external providers, 
providing good local jobs and generating additional income for Mid-Town. A senior 
manager explained, “our strategy has been to win work privately so we’ve expanded 
our work-base from being wholly [Mid-Town] to other areas.” This upstream 
strategy of internalisation and trading council services, such as environmental 
management, necessitated more active staff involvement alongside higher 
performance standards. 
This approach had major implications for the traditional relationship between local 
politicians (referred to as councillors or members) and the managerial leadership in 
which local politicians were the dominant influence. Mid-Town had a legacy of 
long-serving members often drawn from the motor industry union movement that 
intervened in operational as well as strategic decisions. There was a widespread 
perception that council members would invariably defend the interests of staff and 
these interventions by councillors eroded senior management authority and 
prevented change. As an executive director explained: 
“Part of what was agreed early on was councillor involvement in personnel 
procedures — disciplinaries, grievances, dismissals — went. And that was obviously 
a really important point to changing the previous culture which was: ‘no one got 
dismissed, therefore managers didn’t bother to try to dismiss anybody therefore 
discipline was quite an issue.’” 
The collaboration between the chief executive and the council leader provided the 
opportunity to alter the role of councillors and this was framed in terms of the 
necessity to improve performance and safeguard services. There was some 
resistance amongst long-serving councillors, but the council leadership emphasised 
its importance in reshaping managerial and staff behaviour in order to achieve the 
political programme of the Labour Party. Trade union representatives, however, 
viewed this change as a reduction of their influence over staff matters because the 
opportunity to appeal to councillors was removed. This signalled a willingness to 
challenge and move away from the traditional politics of Labour controlled councils. 
The reduced involvement of councillors in staffing matters was accompanied by 
more far-reaching managerial restructuring. From 2008, the emergence of the 
financial crisis and the anticipated effects on public spending reinforced this 
approach. Approximately one in ten managers took early retirement or voluntary 
redundancy contributing to job losses to ensure financial viability in anticipation of 
national austerity measures. As one manager commented about the incoming CEO: 
“It was very very ruthless, you know. We’ve never seen anything like this before. 
The guy means business. He’d come in and then he stood up and said: ‘within x 
amount of time we want the staffing below 1,000’ — it was like 1,500 — he changed 
the whole ethos.” 
The stated objective of the council leadership at Mid-Town, however, was to reverse 
longstanding poor financial and service performance, but it was framed as a strategy 
designed to safeguard the employment prospects of a smaller workforce. Job 
reductions were in part legitimised by reference to weak past performance and were 
presented as part of a process of corporate transformation. As the CEO explained: 
“You do need some burning platform which is going to shift people a bit so the fact 
that we had an early financial challenge did help us.” 
An extensive organisational development remit focused on changing managerial 
behaviour and equipping them with the skills to “build a world-class city for 
everyone”, putting pressure on managers to improve staff performance. These 
measures were viewed as pre-conditions to achieving what the leadership termed 
“council 2012”. This set an ambition to reduce expenditure by 20 per cent whilst 
achieving improvement in service outcomes by 20 per cent to respond to budgetary 
cuts and to ensure competitive in-house services. All services were systematically 
reviewed and reorganised. The waste service was a priority, because it was the 
largest service and had always been provided in-house, but service standards were 
low. The council leadership’s preference was to maintain the service in-house to 
support its trading and income generation strategy, but this commitment was 
conditional on achieving quality and cost targets. In contrast to some Labour 
councils in the past, there was no explicit preference for the provision of in-house 
services stemming from antipathy towards outsourcing. Staff had 12 months to 
address productivity issues or face market testing and the prospect of being 
outsourced. Workforce representatives were sceptical of the Council’s support for 
an in-house service as a trade union representative explained: 
“I honestly believed they wanted a private company to come in and do the refuse to 
start with but as the fundamental service review went on and ideas came out — a lot 
of the ideas came from the blokes.” 
It was a willingness to draw on the workforce’s knowledge to redesign service 
delivery that helped convince the workforce that senior managers were giving 
serious consideration to in-house service provision, if cost reductions and improved 
service standards were achieved. Each refuse crew was involved in examining their 
rounds and the work flow of the system. There were major changes in work 
organisation and many of the existing pay allowances were removed and the 
numbers of staff on each refuse truck reduced from four to three. There were no 
redundancies, however, because reorganisation involved the removal of agency 
staff, retirements and redeployment. A productivity agreement with the trade union 
Unite, committed the workforce to achieve absence levels of less than ten days per 
annum. In return, the council leadership agreed to maintain the service in-house for 
seven years with the possibility of an extension for a further seven years as long as 
service levels and absence targets were achieved. 
A harder edged-managerial approach of “tough love” is therefore not confined to 
Conservative councils that have often been identified as the most enthusiastic 
proponents of job reductions and outsourcing (Ascher 1987; Colling, 1993). Mid-
Town framed their strategy initially as in response to financial and performance 
challenges. The onset of the financial crisis and austerity measures generated a pro-
austerity narrative that facilitated the council leadership in reducing jobs and terms 
and conditions, but this was combined with “mechanisms of hope” (Brunsson, 2006) 
that signalled a willingness to maintain services in-house if performance 
requirements were achieved and to reward the workforce if performance standards 
were achieved (see below). This strategy accounts for job reductions at Labour 
controlled Mid-Town in 2008-2010 that were proportionately larger than at Coastal, 
a Conservative council, committed to a leaner council workforce. 
4.2. Coastal 
Coastal is an urban authority responsible for delivering a wider set of services than 
Mid-town which included oversight of schools and the provision of social services. 
During 2008 a Conservative administration was elected and like Mid-Town it 
framed its strategy in relation to a context of austerity, building on a legacy of 
outsourced services. Budgetary reductions with cost reductions of around 25 per cent 
planned over three years reinforced the need to generate substantial savings and 
outsourcing was an important component of this approach. Trade union opposition 
to the council’s leadership enabled anti-austerity frames to take hold with prolonged 
strike action. In contrast to Mid-town the council leadership struggled to use pro-
austerity frames to legitimate their approach. This was despite an explicit strategy to 
becoming a commissioning council in which Coastal would purchase and monitor 
services from a range of providers but not necessarily deliver them in-house: 
“The task is to meet the needs of our customers in different ways, through different 
approaches….we want to bring services together with other councils and public 
bodies as well as commission services through the private and voluntary sector to 
reduce costs and improve service standards.” 
Outsourcing was an important element of this strategy to strengthen the customer 
focus and downgrade the importance of in-house service delivery, but the approach 
was more nuanced than opponents acknowledged. As the council leader explained: 
“The public sector is dominated by unions and left-wing activists and the rest. Public 
services to me are providing services to the public and who cares if this is the city 
council [that] empties your bin? Now we didn’t outsource bins [refuse] because it 
did a good job…so my philosophy was always: improving the service, or a saving 
or preferably both — but it wasn’t just outsourcing for outsourcing’s sake.” 
Coastal had already agreed a ten year contract with a major private services provider 
that covered four main areas of activity with 600 Coastal staff transferred during 
2007-08. The services outsourced included customer services, information 
technologies, property, revenue and benefits, HR, payroll and procurement services. 
It would have been very costly and difficult to alter this outsourcing approach and 
bring services back in-house. The Conservative administration aimed to use the 
contract to generate savings and provide a one-stop-shop for council services. It also, 
however, strained employment relations in part because the new service provider 
required all employees to re-authorise their trade union deductions after transfer, 
leading to a loss of union membership. 
Two aspects of the strategy to move towards a commissioning authority generated 
downstream implementation difficulties and enabled anti-austerity frames to gain 
support amongst the workforce. This process stemmed from the externalisation of 
HR services and resulted in an acrimonious relationship with the external provider. 
The poor working relationships between the external HR provider and the in-house 
client side was exemplified by HR staff that transferred to the external provider being 
viewed as “defectors”. Very little internal HR expertise remained within Coastal and 
employment relations activity was not managed by HR specialists. This had major 
consequences for management-union relations as an opposition councillor noted: 
“The mistake the council made was that not only did we get rid of human resources 
but we had no human resources client side team except for a nominal head of human 
resources who in fact is a lawyer… he’s effectively got no background in HR, no 
background in dealing with trade unions.” 
This gap was filled by a Conservative council leader that behaved more like an 
elected mayor, taking more direct control of the management of the Council. This 
was attributed to the leader’s political ambitions. He outlined the relationship with 
the CEO in which the leader was very much in charge: 
“His job [the CEO] is to do what the administration tell him to do... he had to work 
with me, didn’t he? He couldn’t not, otherwise, his position with me would be 
untenable and as I’ve said to him, just so we know how this works, ‘if I can’t work 
with you and I have been elected, which one of us would have to leave?’ and that 
was the only time I put it to him, and of course he said to me, ‘So that would be me 
then wouldn’t it’. And that’s the way it is in democracy isn’t it?” 
One consequence of this political and managerial style was that negotiations 
between the council and the workforce were led by the leader rather than the chief 
executive. This contributed to the difficult atmosphere because there were polarised 
political differences between the Conservative leadership and the trade union 
representatives, which would have been less prominent if the negotiations had been 
led by politically unaligned managers. 
Consequently an upstream strategic decision to move towards a commissioning 
council model and outsource HR, “hollowed out” HR expertise and placed 
constraints on Coastal’s ability to deliver its change strategy and to use pro-austerity 
frames to justify wage cuts and outsourcing. The political leader was highly 
interventionist in operational as well as strategic matters and was accused by critics 
of acting like an elected mayor, generating tensions with the chief executive and 
trade unions. Moreover this management strategy provided opportunities for trade 
unions to frame austerity measures as a local, ideologically motivated, programme 
rather than as part of a national agenda of retrenchment. 
5. Downstream decisions: Management-
union relations and reward management 
5.1. Mid-Town 
Mid-Town’s upstream strategy of service improvement, trading and enhanced 
performance, drawing on a climate of austerity to pursue this agenda, necessitated 
repositioning of management-union relations to ensure workforce support. This was 
in a context in which Unison and Unite had a combined trade union membership of 
almost 45 per cent of the workforce, but this membership was viewed by trade union 
representatives as passive and hard to engage. Senior manager’s aim was to ensure 
constructive relations with trade unions, but this was part of a dual approach in which 
trade union involvement sat alongside direct and frequent communication with the 
workforce. 
Symbolic of managerial efforts to redirect management-union relations towards 
partnership working was the replacement of the Joint Consultative Committee 
(JCC), the forum for trade union-employer discussions. It was replaced by the 
Partnership Working Group (PWG) with the agreement, but limited enthusiasm, of 
trade union representatives. The PWG met quarterly rather than every six weeks and 
the agenda was focused more on specific strategic issues, replacing as the HR 
director described it “HR bashing”. Regular attendance by the CEO indicated that it 
was an important forum for information sharing and to some extent consultation, 
albeit very much on a managerially directed agenda. Despite misgivings, Unite and 
Unison, were supportive of Mid-Town’s strategy and only occasionally contested 
managerial actions. As a Unison representative stated: 
“We do have a very good working relationship and I’ve been involved in trade 
unions now for 25 years — and it’s the first time [Mid-Town] has had this type of 
relationship with management… it’s more transparent — and we do talk about 
everything.” 
Trade union representatives also noted that the council had become a Living Wage 
employer (i.e. paying a higher minimum wage than the statutory minimum wage). 
External assessment by Investors in People (IIP) also reported that Mid-Town: 
“values its people extremely highly, and values learning and development similarly 
highly”. Trade union willingness to acquiesce in partnership working partly reflected 
confidence in the managerial leadership of the Council, but also recognition of the 
limited influence that trade unions could exert in shaping managerial practice. This 
was attributed by union representatives to the fear of job losses, depletion of the pool 
of long-term trade union activists through restructuring, and a degree of fatalism 
amongst the workforce in a climate of austerity. 
As budgetary cuts deepened, trade unions confronted a more severe challenge and 
the CEO used pro-austerity frames to gain acceptance for his strategy: 
“We went to the trade unions and said … ‘It looks like lots of job losses, you know, 
maybe 10% of people go down the road… if you are willing to forgo [a pay increase], 
so no-one’s pay would go down, but no-one would get the increases they are 
expecting and in exchange we would do a couple of things. One, we will try to 
minimise redundancies as much as possible… we will use natural wastage and spend 
more on training and retraining people and as much as we can avoid compulsory 
redundancies.’” 
Mid-Town’s leadership had a strong preference for achieving a negotiated local 
collective agreement because it would reinforce productive relations with the trade 
unions and ensure legitimacy for their strategy. By contrast imposition of their plans 
would have released trade unions from any obligation to support management and 
risked the workforce framing the pay deal as detrimental to their interests and 
requiring them to absorb the consequences of austerity measures. 
A local collective pay agreement (2011-13) proposed opting out of national pay 
determination and the on-going national pay freeze, the suspension of increments 
for two years and reductions in some allowances in exchange for assurances on 
maintaining jobs. It also proposed the establishment of a “partnership payment” 
bonus, linked to satisfactory individual performance appraisal outcomes and 
attendance as well as Mid-Town achieving its efficiency target. The council 
leadership indicated that they were very reluctant to impose change unilaterally and 
made concerted efforts to gain support for the deal, but were uncertain if it would be 
accepted because of its focus on individual performance. 
The workforce was uncertain about the likelihood of the partnership payment 
materialising. As a Unite representative noted, “the jury was out at the time whether 
it would or wouldn’t be paid”, but separate Unite and Unison ballots endorsed the 
collective agreement. Over 90 per cent of staff met the appraisal and attendance 
criteria and received a one off payment of £416. The partnership payment and 
associated local collective agreement signalled a clear shift from progression based 
on time-served to an emphasis on individual performance and attendance. One senior 
manager commented that it was a “softly, softly” approach: 
“They weren’t high barriers to jump over — it’s a means of showing that 
performance and attendance are relevant to the overall performance of the council.” 
Trade union representatives were ambivalent about the partnership agreement 
because they acknowledged it enhanced managerial control over individual 
performance and involved the effective removal of incremental progression; very 
substantial trade union concessions. The recommendation, however, to accept the 
deal was influenced by a substantial number of staff having no further scope for 
incremental progression and the influence on union members’ of an extended 
national pay freeze as part of national austerity measures. Consequently, there was 
no membership appetite to contest management proposals, members were broadly 
supportive of the overall management strategy and were frightened of losing their 
jobs. A Unison representative noted the impact of pro-austerity frames, “the cuts 
have had a massive effect. It’s just so much apathy” but also acknowledged that 
unlike other authorities mandatory redundancies had been avoided, “That’s gone 
down very well with our members”. 
Recognition that austerity budgetary cuts would continue for many years encouraged 
consideration of the successor collective agreement. During early 2013 staff were 
invited to a series of road shows with presentations from the CEO, HR director and 
Unison/Unite and this was backed up by a guide for staff New pay deal for all that 
was endorsed and signed by all parties to highlight partnership working. The guide 
outlined the rationale for the new deal, not least the fact that a third of its government 
grant had been cut between 2010-2013, highlighted efficiency savings made to date 
and emphasised the Council’s unity of purpose: 
“Where some other organisations are looking to redundancies as a way of dealing 
with pressures on their budgets, [Mid-Town] is sticking to its principles and working 
with trade unions to manage its way through these difficult times.” 
The proposals extended and refined the partnership payment philosophy. Both 
unions endorsed the agreement and Unison, actively campaigned for a yes vote 
suggesting that the council might discontinue the partnership payment and remove 
weekend enhancements and overtime rates if the deal was rejected. The outcome 
was overwhelming support for the new agreement. Although turn out is not stated, 
amongst Unison members 93% voted for the proposals and 7% against. Amongst 
Unite members over 80% voted in favour of the agreement. 
The main components of the 5 year agreement (2013-2018) were approved by the 
full council in April 2013. The agreement ensured that the link with national 
bargaining was ended. Instead an annual 1.5% cost-of living pay increase is paid to 
all staff and the partnership payment system was continued but within a revamped 
appraisal system. The agreement also stated that on the basis that Unite/Unison 
comply with the agreement “during the currency of this Agreement there shall be no 
compulsory job losses to front line staff” (para 16.1) provided that the material 
circumstances of the council do not alter (e.g. further significant cuts in government 
funding). 
5.2. Coastal 
In comparison to Mid-Town, Coastal’s leadership were unable to gain trade union 
support for its strategy. Trade union density was close to 50 per cent with strongholds 
of union membership in services that had not been outsourced, such as refuse 
collection. In addition, both the Unite and Unison convenors were on their national 
union executives that facilitated access to national trade union resources and 
opportunities to develop anti-austerity frames amongst the workforce. The council 
leadership’s decision to review paid time off for trade union activities during a period 
of rapid change was considered provocative and reinforced attempts by trade unions 
to portray the Council’s strategy as ideologically motivated, despite being presented 
as a financial decision. A council motion stated: 
“The Council recognises that in these tough financial times, local authorities need to 
make difficult decisions about spending priorities and therefore supports the 
Executive in reviewing the merits of fulltime union officials funded by the taxpayer 
and the provision of office facilities to trade unions.” 
In response to budgetary reductions, Coastal’s leadership proposed a 5 per cent pay 
cut for all staff, no pay increments for two years (2011-2013) and every member of 
staff was to move back one pay increment. Sick pay and a variety of allowances 
were to be cut or removed. The aim was to reduce the wagebill, but it was also 
intended to signal that employment in Coastal, even on worse terms and conditions, 
remained highly attractive. As the council leader explained: 
“If we cut their pay, however modest… it was to do two things: one was the spoken 
and that was to protect jobs and save money, the second which was not spoken but 
in the end I suppose was after 6 months was that… you’re better [off] on two pounds 
a week less in this place than you are on £65 per week job seekers allowance out 
there.” 
These proposals were outlined in an already difficult employment relations climate 
that was attributed to an unwillingness of the council’s management to use 
established channels of consultation and plans to reduce trade union facilities. The 
upstream strategy of externalisation generated further employment relations 
difficulties because, as a Unite representative argued, “as far as we saw it there was 
a politically driven strategy of outsourcing and privatisation of services”. The trade 
unions, however, utilised Coastal’s policy programme to develop an anti-austerity 
frame. They used attacks on the council leader, to portray the administration’s 
policies as ideologically driven with detrimental consequences for the workforce, 
limiting the council’s ability to portray wage cuts as a necessary response to 
government budgetary reductions. 
Such an approach was made more straightforward because negotiations between 
Coastal and the workforce were led by the council leader who adopted a high public 
profile. 
Negotiations generated some employer concessions in terms of protection for the 
lowest paid and the removal of plans to stop paying staff for the first three days of 
sickness absence. The final employer offer included the removal of increments for 
two years and pay cuts of between 2 and 5.5 per cent (depending on annual income), 
but included a £250 increase to those earning less than £21,000 per year. Voluntary 
redundancy payments were enhanced and there was a guarantee of no further 
compulsory redundancies below senior manager grade. Crucially, however, the 
package endorsed by the full council included the recommendation that: 
“Approves the dismissal and re-engagement of staff in order to implement the 
changes in terms and conditions in the event that a collective agreement cannot be 
reached with the unions.” 
Unite and Unison faced a series of dilemmas in responding to these proposals. There 
was a recognition that the dispute and threat of pay cuts had national implications 
because of concerns that other councils would emulate Coastal’s example, but the 
dispute was a local dispute reliant on local membership support. A second dilemma 
related to uncertainty about the extent to which trade union members would be 
prepared to take industrial action in a national climate in which the necessity of 
austerity measures was constantly emphasised. Accommodating pay reductions was 
therefore considered, as a Unite representative explained: 
“It wasn’t something that we discounted out of hand… so we could see the incentive 
of doing that if there was a guarantee [on jobs]. And also that we wanted to look at 
some time-limited effect of their pay cuts, so at some point in the future we wanted 
the pay to be restored. On both counts they refused to give any guarantees and these 
cuts were permanent.” 
A third dilemma related to the contradictory effects of industrial action. The Council 
faced local elections and the trade unions were campaigning for the Labour Party 
with an expectation that an incoming administration would soften some of the pay 
cuts. Extended and high-profile industrial action might generate short-term 
concessions, but could damage support for the Labour Party because of its link to 
the trade unions, jeopardising longer-term outcomes favourable to the workforce. 
The upshot was protracted negotiations with the Council leadership, but a failure to 
resolve the dispute shifted the trade unions towards a three-pronged union strategy: 
selective strike action, a legal challenge related to alleged failure to provide the 
statutory consultation period for dismissals, and a political campaign to mobilise 
voters in local elections to remove the Conservative administration. The trade 
unions’ strategy took account of but did not resolve fully the dilemmas they 
confronted. In particular in a national context in which pro-austerity frames were 
dominant, exemplified by employment reductions and a national pay freeze, and 
with limited alternative employment prospects, there was considerable uncertainty 
if union members would support industrial action that aimed to mobilise anti-
austerity assumptions and arguments. 
Ballots for strike action resulted in a small majority, just over 50 per cent, for strike 
action on a low membership turn-out. This was not a convincing mandate and trade 
union responses therefore concentrated on selective high-profile rolling industrial 
action by the most organised groups that would put the most pressure on the council. 
Unite and Unison tried to convert weakness into strength by not relying on the whole 
union membership to take strike action and ensuring that workers received strike pay 
to maintain their commitment to strike action. Action short of a strike included an 
overtime ban, working to contract, and a refusal by staff such as social workers to 
use their cars for council business. Selective strike action by parking attendants hit 
council revenue but did not stop the provision of council services to residents. A 
Unite representative explained: 
“we decided rather than have everyone out for one day, which has pretty much no 
effect anyway, just saves the council a lot of money and wages and everyone goes 
back to work next day and catches up. We wanted to select high profile and income 
generating services and take those people out for long periods of time. And we paid 
them their full pay once they were out.” 
A second strand of trade union strategy related to legal action to delay and 
subsequently seek compensation for the imposition of new terms and conditions of 
employment. Coastal used section 188 notices to dismiss and re-engage staff, 
requiring a 90 day period of statutory consultation. Trade unions argued that these 
requirements had not been followed and pursued an employment tribunal case. If 
Coastal had lost the employment tribunal they faced the prospect of a large 
compensation bill for all employees that were dismissed and re-engaged in summer 
2011. 
A third strand of trade union strategy involved a political campaign working with 
Coastal’s Labour group, to remove the Conservative administration in upcoming 
local elections. As a union official explained: 
“Council workers have this sort of unique opportunity to sack their boss every now 
and again. And obviously we knew the local elections were coming up and the 
number of, the Tory majority wasn’t particularly large, so we knew that there was a 
very good chance that they could lose power.” 
This involved extensive leafleting explaining the reasons for the on-going dispute 
and criticising the Conservative administration using an anti-austerity frame to 
portray the leadership’s response as ideologically driven. In subsequent local 
elections, a Labour administration was formed within Coastal and pledged a phased 
reversal of pay cuts. 
6. Discussion 
The extent to which public service employers are able to develop a strategic 
approach has been a long-standing preoccupation of employment relations analysis 
and this debate has been reignited in a period of austerity and extended to incorporate 
analysis of trade union strategy. Since the 1980s and 1990s when strategic choice 
approaches were first applied to public services (Kessler and Purcell, 2000ab), 
public service restructuring has continued apace. These trends have been intensified 
by the global financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures with deep cuts in 
local government funding. In this altered context there has been considerable 
uncertainty about the scope for organisational level choice and the form that any 
such choices would take. 
It is important to recognise the limitations of drawing on two case studies in England 
that may not be generalisable to other settings. The value of these cases resides in 
their distinctiveness as identified by sector actors and the extent that they bring into 
sharp relief the application of strategic choice frameworks. The two case studies 
indicated distinctive strategies in responding to restructuring and austerity measures 
that belies the emphasis in many accounts of neo-liberal convergence towards 
similar policies of marketization and privatization. Mid-Town’s approach reflected 
a historical legacy in which in-house services had always prevailed and councillors 
intervened in staff management, but this legacy was redirected into a proactive 
strategy of service improvement and income generation to safeguard employment in 
the longer term. This approach was facilitated by the alignment of the political and 
managerial leadership and the development of a carefully calibrated labour–
management and reward strategy. Trade unions had misgivings about the 
downgrading of councillor involvement, the proposed local collective agreement and 
a tougher managerial stance, but in a context of a national pay freeze and the 
dominance of pro-austerity frames, trade unions acquiesced in this strategy and 
developed co-operative relations with the council leadership. The establishment of 
the partnership payment compensated staff that had not received a national pay 
increase but also enhanced performance management. 
Coastal’s leadership inherited a large outsourcing deal and more emphasis was 
placed on an externalisation strategy as part of a shift to become a commissioning 
authority that procured but did not provide services. The council leadership placed 
less emphasis on gaining trade union support for its approach and there was limited 
incentive to pursue partnership approaches with a workforce that included many 
outsourced services. Coastal’s leadership, after a protracted dispute, imposed wage 
cuts and employment reductions as a contribution to budgetary reductions. Trade 
unions faced limited support for prolonged strike action, but used selective strikes 
amongst the most organised workers and utilised anti–austerity frames. They 
portrayed the council leadership as pursuing an ideological, privatisation orientated 
approach, that contributed to pay cuts and which unfairly placed the burden of 
adjustment on the workforce. 
An important question relates to how much austerity measures represent a critical 
juncture for public sector employment relations in which the “shock” of austerity 
measures has a transformative effect on existing employment relations practice 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). The effects of budgetary constraints and an era of 
austerity are clearly visible with similarities between the case studies in terms of 
large reductions in employment between 2008-2012 (Figure 1). Nonetheless, each 
authority responded to budgetary restrictions in a distinctive way that was influenced 
by the specific legacy of in-house provision and political party traditions, but these 
legacies did not pre-determine the policies and practices pursued. In the case of Mid-
Town services had always been provided in-house, but a weak financial and 
managerial legacy reinforced by budgetary cuts proved a springboard for a unified 
managerial and political leadership to redirect this legacy towards a more ambitious 
trading model and the recalibration of management union relations. In Coastal there 
was a legacy of outsourcing and a new political leadership sought to extend 
outsourcing into a more encompassing form of commissioning authority in response 
to budgetary cuts. Despite decades of public sector restructuring, these findings 
suggest that employers have used the austerity crisis to build on this legacy, 
departing further from pre-existing practice in local government. 
This article has also extended and recalibrated strategic choice frameworks to 
develop a more dynamic understanding of the blending of choice and constraint. In 
contrast to earlier studies that separate choice at organisational level from constraint 
at national level this article has emphasised the blending of choice and constraint 
that connects national and local level developments. In analysing strategic choice 
institutional constraints and ideological narratives have been reframed as resources 
by local actors. The existence of a three year national pay freeze was a constraint but 
it was also an enabler and facilitator of local choice, most evidently in Mid-Town’s 
opting out of national pay determination and the development of a partnership 
payment. By contrast, in Coastal the choice to outsource HR established local 
constraints on HR capacity and involvement that inhibited their ability to negotiate 
effectively with the workforce. 
This article has also highlighted the importance of pro- and anti-austerity frames that 
have been marshalled by local actors in framing their strategic choices. Although 
austerity measures are widely conceived as associated with a neo-liberal ideology 
that favours market-based governance (Blyth, 2013; Grimshaw, 2013) there has been 
little attempt to understand how ideology enables or constraints employer choice. 
This article has focused on austerity as it relates to practice that draws on austerity 
as ideology, but recognises the scope for differentiated strategies. In Mid-Town the 
council leadership used pro-austerity frames sparingly but effectively to present 
workforce adjustments as necessary and inevitable and linked to government 
budgetary cuts that resulted in job losses and a pay freeze. At the same time 
“narratives of hope” (Brunsson, 2006) were employed to indicate a better future that 
was reinforced by the partnership payment, subsequent pay settlements that 
exceeded national settlements and support for the living wage, signalling an 
ambition to remain a good employer. By contrast in Coastal austerity measures were 
attributed as much to the council leadership rather than stemming primarily from 
government policy, enabling anti-austerity frames to gain ground. Local trade unions 
were effective at portraying the council leadership as ideologically committed to 
shrinking the local state and punishing the workforce. The imposition of pay cuts, 
the dismissal and re-engagement of the workforce and limited attempts to resolve 
strike action reinforced the credibility of these anti-austerity frames. 
In contrast to previous studies of strategic choice that identified limited variation in 
downstream decision making, this article has emphasised the extent to which 
strategic choice affects not only upstream decisions relating to organisational 
strategy, but also downstream decisions of management-union relations and 
rewards. Although there are some continuities with the past in terms of the 
maintenance of systems of national pay determination (Colling, 1993; Kessler, 2000) 
our results indicate increased experimentation in altering terms and conditions on a 
local basis and shifts in union-management relations towards partnership or 
unilateralism. Local variations in core national conditions, such as reductions in sick 
pay or annual level, have been reported by many local authorities (IDS, 2013) 
indicating a recalibration of the balance between national and local decision and an 
undermining of the regulatory influence of the local government national agreement, 
enhancing the scope for local strategic choice. 
Finally, we have engaged with the extension of strategic choice frameworks to trade 
unions, exemplified by the analysis of organising and partnership strategies. This 
was not the main focus of the article and we have concentrated on trade union policy 
and practice at organisational level. Our findings are equivocal about how far trade 
unions are adopting a strategic response to public sector restructuring and austerity 
measures; trade unions remain secondary organisations with responses conditioned 
by the approaches of their employer. This is not to suggest that trade unions have no 
scope for choice as the decision to accommodate or confront management in the two 
cases illustrates, but this process is better characterised as strategic incrementalism 
(Fairbrother, 2010, p. 207) reflecting trade unions adaptive response to employer 
proposals in a very challenging fiscal climate. 
To conclude, this article has contributed to debate about contemporary employment 
relations in public services by reframing the interaction of choice and constraint and 
providing organisational level evidence on how employers are responding to 
budgetary reductions. Constraints can be enabling for employers and these 
constraints extend beyond much discussed frameworks such as national pay 
determination to include ideologies of austerity that are marshalled by local actors 
to advance their strategies. Austerity is a much used term and has real implications 
for employment relations practice but these adjustments are more variable and 
differentiated at local level than is captured by the notion of “shocks” or an 
assumption of convergence on a dominant neo-liberal agenda. 
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